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INTRODUCTION
Recent withdrawal of Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
approved drugs from the market, increased safety warnings of
FDA-approved drugs, and highly publicized pharmaceutical
products liability litigation have drawn attention to the mechanism
by which the FDA and pharmaceutical manufacturers evaluate the
safety of FDA-approved drugs. A report from the Institute of
Medicine 1 suggests the FDA has not effectively monitored the
safety of pharmaceuticals subsequent to initial approval for use and
recommends changes to the process by which the FDA monitors
postmarketing-adverse-event-surveillance.
The congressional
response, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, 2 enhances the ability of the FDA to implement a plan for
periodic postmarket evaluation of pharmaceuticals and enforce the
obligation of manufacturers to perform FDA-requested postmarket
safety studies via penalties or fines. 3 This plan, however, fails to
provide incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers to employ
important ongoing postmarket safety evaluation of their drugs.
A PDF version of this Note is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2940. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; Ph.D., Biochemistry,
City University of New York. The author would like to thank Professors Jeanne Fromer
and Benjamin Zipursky for their guidance and comments on drafts of this
Note.
1
COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE US DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED. OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH
OF THE PUBLIC (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton, Sheila P. Burke, eds., 2007) [hereinafter
THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY].
2
Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
3
21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2007).
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Like other businesses, the pharmaceutical industry is driven by
the profit motive. 4 Profitability of pharmaceutical companies is
dependent on balancing the costs of identifying, developing,
patenting, testing and obtaining approval to market a new drug
with the ability to market the drug at a reasonable price during the
patent term. 5 In part because the industry generates huge profits, 6
it has been severely criticized for focusing on profitability at the
expense of the consumer 7 —in terms of both price protection 8 and
safety. Nonetheless, the pharmaceutical industry is, in fact, an
economic enterprise driven by maximization of profits. 9
Consequently, postmarket safety evaluation of pharmaceuticals
must be profitable in order to ensure compliance.
This Note proposes a promising mechanism of ensuring more
crucial postmarket safety evaluations of pharmaceuticals by
extending the exclusive marketing period—normally limited to the
patent term—as a reward. 10 Extending the exclusivity period has
been demonstrated to be an effective incentive for pharmaceutical
manufacturers to perform additional studies, 11 while having no
impact on the timing of the initial FDA approval for marketing. 12
The expense of post-approval testing is likely to be balanced by
ample earnings during the reward period, making the choice of
performing such testing economically attractive. In addition, the
benefit to consumers resulting from the increase in safety of
marketed pharmaceuticals counteracts any negative financial
4

See Richard A. Epstein, What’s Good for Pharma is Good for America, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/
2006/12/03/whats_good_for_pharma_is_good_for_america.
5
See id.
6
The pharmaceutical industry generates about $250 billion in revenue. See id.
7
See generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005).
8
Americans spent more than $200 billion on prescription drugs over the past year.
See IMS Health, http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/pages/homeFlash/us/0,2764,
6599,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (providing statistics on retail pharmaceutical
sales, updated monthly).
9
See Epstein, supra note 4.
10
See infra Part III.A.
11
See infra Part III.B.
12
Since the extension period and the additional studies would occur after the drug has
been FDA approved, it would have no effect on the timing of initial FDA approval for
marketing.
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impact on consumers that extended exclusivity may cause. 13
Moreover, market exclusivity applied to marketed products
stimulates further innovation and development of those and related
products, resulting in a general benefit to the health of the
population. 14
Part I of this Note discusses the problem of drugs reaching the
market with undiscovered, but discoverable, risks that result in
harm to consumers. Part II of this Note explains how the
economic structure of the pharmaceutical industry, including the
regulatory system, protection of the patent monopoly and
anticipation of liability, provides disincentive for further safety
testing of pharmaceuticals. Part III puts forth a proposal to
incentivize post-approval safety testing of pharmaceuticals by
extending the period of market exclusivity. Implementation of this
proposal should result in increased knowledge of the risks of
marketed pharmaceuticals, improving the safety of these products.
I. DEFECTIVE DRUGS REACH THE MARKET RESULTING IN HARM
Extensive safety and efficacy testing is required in order for a
pharmaceutical to obtain FDA approval for marketing. 15
Nonetheless, adverse drug reactions 16 revealed subsequent to FDA
13
The financial impact on consumers, resulting from extending the exclusivity period,
would have to be balanced against the value of increased safety of marketed
pharmaceuticals resulting from the additional studies in order to determine an optimal
length of time for the reward. Balancing of these factors is not the subject of this Note.
14
See Gregory J. Glover, The Influence of Market Exclusivity on Drug Availability and
Medical Innovations, 9 AM. ASS’N PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. J. E312, E315 (2007) (“IP
rights extended to final, marketable drug products make further, related innovation
possible. . . . IP protection of a marketable drug product encourages not only
development of that product but further development of related innovations to expand
and improve therapies and cures.”).
15
See Michelle Meadows, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe
and Effective, 36 FDA CONSUMER 19 (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/Fdac/
features/2002/402_drug.html (briefly outlining the FDA approval process); see also 21
C.F.R. § 314 (2008) (providing the federal regulations for new drug approval).
16
An adverse drug reaction is “a response to a medicine which is noxious and
unintended, and which occurs at doses normally used in man.” WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
SAFETY OF MEDICINES: A GUIDE TO DETECTING AND REPORTING ADVERSE DRUG
REACTIONS, WHY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS NEED TO TAKE ACTION 5 (2002), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/WHO_EDM_QSM_2002.2.pdf. Adverse drug events
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approval and products liability suits demonstrate that
pharmaceuticals approved for marketing may cause harm to their
users. Incentivizing pharmaceutical manufacturers to perform
postmarket safety research would result in increased knowledge of
those risks, which may be included in improved warning labels,
thereby enhancing the safety of marketed pharmaceuticals.
Part A of this section discusses why the current method of
evaluating the safety of drugs approved for marketing is
inadequate to maximize their safety. Part B provides examples of
marketed pharmaceuticals that had serious risks that would have
been discoverable through well-designed postmarket studies.
A. Current Safety Testing of Pharmaceuticals is Inadequate
Although the FDA is charged with implementing procedures to
maximize the safety of drugs approved for marketing, 17 the
incidence of adverse drug events demonstrates that defective drugs
reach the market, resulting in harm. 18 Drugs are found to be
defective most frequently based on the criteria for failure to warn
of risks associated with use rather than alternative theories of
design or manufacturing defects. 19
Generally, pharmaceutical manufacturers become aware of
potential risks associated with use of a drug during clinical trials

include adverse drug reactions and negative responses to drugs due to error. See MariaJose Otero, Alfonso Dominguez-Gil, Angel A. Bajo, & Jose A. Maderuelo,
Characteristics Associated with Ability to Prevent Adverse Drug Reactions in
Hospitalized Patients—A Comment, 19 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1185, 1185 (1999).
17
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2000) (delineating
the mission of the FDA); Meadows, supra note 15 (describing the procedures the FDA
uses to maximize safety of drugs approved for marketing).
18
See Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 607
(2005) (discussing the FDA’s inability to address all safety issues prior to products
entering market); see also Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Medical Errors: Understanding Adverse Drug Events, Address Before the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (Feb. 1, 2000), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t000201a.html (indicating that some adverse drug
reactions are due to undiscovered side effects not included in product labelling).
19
LARS NOAH & BARBARA NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 523
(2002).
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conducted for the purpose of approval by the FDA. 20 These risks
of drug use are included in the package inserts 21 and in information
provided to the prescribing physicians. Although extensive
research, including safety and efficacy studies, is required for FDA
approval to market a pharmaceutical, the research is necessarily
limited in size, scope and time. 22 Consequently, side effects
occurring at low frequencies, due to longer duration of drug use,
and occurring in particular subpopulations, are generally not
discovered in the pre-approval period. 23 As a result, the actual
extent of discoverable risks associated with an FDA-approved drug
is not known and, therefore, not communicated to prescribing
physicians or consumers. 24
During the postmarketing period, adverse drug reactions 25
become more apparent due to the more widespread use of the drug
over a longer period of time in a heterogeneous population. 26 The
incidence of adverse drug reactions illustrates the extent of the
problem. Adverse drug reactions ranked between the fourth and
sixth leading cause of death in the United States 27 and comprise
three percent of hospital admissions. 28 Among patients already
20
See Woodcock, supra note 18 (noting that more frequent adverse reactions are
usually detected in clinical trials before drugs go on the market); Struve, supra note 18, at
587.
21
See FDA, Drugs@FDA Instructions: Health Information, http://www.fda.gov/cder/
drugsatfda/instructionsHealth.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008) (defining a “Patient
Package Insert” as containing “information for patients on how to safely use a drug
product” and a “part of the FDA-approved labeling”).
22
See THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 1, at 37–39.
23
See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve, supra note 18, at 597–99; see also William
M. Sage, Drug Product Liability and Health Care Delivery Systems, 40 STAN. L. REV.
989, 990 (1988) (noting that adverse drug reactions may depend on individual chemistry
of the patients and may not be revealed for years).
24
The limited sample size and duration of pre-approval studies compromise the ability
of the FDA to identify safety problems and to reveal low frequency adverse events. See
THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 1, at 37.
25
See supra note 16 (defining adverse drug reaction).
26
See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve supra note 18, at 597–99; see also Sage,
supra note 23.
27
See Jason Lazarou, Bruce H. Pomeranz & Paul N. Corey, Incidence of Adverse Drug
Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1200, 1202 (1998) (citing data from 1994).
28
Robert L. Kane, Iatrogenesis: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 5 J. COMMUNITY
HEALTH 149, 150 (1980).
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hospitalized, approximately one-third experience an adverse drug
reaction. 29 The annual direct cost of managing adverse drug
reactions of hospitalized adults is estimated to be between $1.6 and
$4.2 billion. 30 Statistics are not available on adverse drug
reactions that do not result in hospitalization.
Individual incidents of adverse drug reactions, revealed
through continued use of approved drugs in the larger population
over time via spontaneous physician or consumer reports, must be
reported by the manufacturer to the FDA. 31 “This collection of
voluntarily submitted case reports represents the weakest form of
The passive nature of the
epidemiologic evidence . . . .” 32
reporting requirement likely results in underreporting of the
incidence of adverse events. 33 In addition, the cause of a reported
adverse reaction to a drug is not necessarily revealed by individual
incidents. Moreover, adverse drug reactions reported over a long
time frame may fail to reveal a trend in the nature of these events
and, rather than suggesting a systematic risk, appear idiosyncratic.
The converse is also possible. That is, a collection of independent
adverse events may appear to represent a risk of use of a drug even
when there is no actual causation.
Nonetheless, analyses of these data by drug manufacturers and
the FDA 34 sometimes result in changes to the package inserts,
stronger label warnings, and withdrawal of drugs from the

29

Id.
See D.C. Classen, S.L. Pestotnik, R.S. Evans, J.F. Lloyd & J.P. Burke, Adverse
Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and
Attributable Mortality, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 301 (1997).
31
Postmarketing Reporting of Adverse Drug Experiences, 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)
(2008); Other Postmarketing Reports, 21 C.F.R. § 314.81 (2008).
32
Bruce M. Psaty & Sheila P. Burke, Protecting the Health of the Public—Institute of
Medicine Recommendations of Drug Safety, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1753 (2006).
33
See Michael A. Friedman, Science for Judges II: The Practice of Epidemiology and
Administrative Agency Created Science: What is the Value of an FDA Approval in a
Judicial Matter?, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 559, 570–71 (2004) (suggesting ten percent or less of
adverse drug events are reported). Considering that adverse drug events include
overdosage and misprescription, as well as side effects, secondary effects and
hypersensitivity, see Otero et al., supra note 25, adverse drug event reporting may be
overinclusive, as well.
34
Of concern is the dependence of the FDA on manufacturers for preapproval drug
testing, postmarket data collection and reporting. See Sage, supra note 23, at 1020.
30
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market. 35 Fifty-six of the 548 drugs approved by the FDA
between 1975 and 1999 were either withdrawn from the market or
required to include a black-box warning—the strictest warning
label. 36 About four percent of drugs are eventually withdrawn
from the market, and twenty percent of drugs get black-box
warnings after approval. 37
However, without systematic
postmarket research, pharmaceuticals may remain on the market
lacking an appropriate warning of risks because those risks have
not been revealed via spontaneous reporting. In addition, useful
pharmaceuticals may be withdrawn from the market because the
extent of risk is not correctly evaluated. 38 Of particular concern is
that patients are harmed in the interval between initial FDA
approval and changes to the package inserts or withdrawal of the
drug from the market.
Data on post-approval adverse drug reactions suggest that
intentional post-approval testing would likely reveal the same
adverse effects earlier and, with planned studies, the data would be

35

See, e.g., FDA, FDA Announces Important Changes and Additional Warnings for
COX-2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs),
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/Drug/advisory/COX2.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008)
(announcing FDA’s request for withdrawal of Bextra and that all manufacturers of
prescription NSAIDs revise their labeling and include more specific risk information in
package inserts).
36
See Karen E. Lasser, Paul D. Allen, Steffe J. Woolhandler, David U. Himmelstein,
Sidney M. Wolfe & David H. Bor, Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals
for Prescription Medications, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2215, 2216 (2002).
37
Id.
38
For example, Tysabri (natalizumab), a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis, was
withdrawn from the market after it was associated with the development of usually fatal
progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy. Burt Adelman, Alfred Sandrock, & Michael
A. Panzara, Natalizumab and Progressive Multifocal Leukoencephalopathy, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 432, 432 (2005). The data (three incidences in 3,116 patients treated over
17.9 months) revealed a risk of 65 fatalities per 100,000 person-years. Joshua T. Cohen &
Peter J. Neumann, What’s More Dangerous, Your Aspirin or Your Car? Thinking
Rationally About Drug Risks (and Benefits), 26 HEALTH AFF. 636 (2007). Because the
risk is low and the drug is effective in mitigating the symptoms for many multiple
sclerosis patients, the FDA reintroduced the drug in 2006, subject to closer risk
management. See C. Sheridan, Tysabri Back on Market, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 874
(2006).
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more reliable. 39 Postmarketing studies for new uses sometimes
reveal side effects, which were not revealed via pre-approval
studies. 40 However, the FDA does not routinely require additional
postmarket research. 41 In fact, until recently, 42 with very few
exceptions, 43 once a drug was approved, the FDA lacked the
authority to require manufacturers to perform postmarketing
studies, even those agreed to prior to approval. 44 Consequently, of
the 1,259 postmarketing studies requested, less than 30 percent
have been initiated. 45 While it is “impossible to design an
absolutely safe drug,” 46 the safety of FDA-approved
pharmaceuticals can be improved by focused research designed to
reveal additional risks. One estimate suggests that up to eighty

39
For a comparison of the merits of different study designs see BETH DAWSON &
ROBERT G. TRAPP, BASIC AND CLINICAL BIOSTATISTICS 19–21 (McGraw-Hill Professional,
2004).
40
Vioxx, for example, was FDA-approved for treatment of pain and inflammation. A
clinical trial to evaluate Vioxx for prevention of recurrent colon polyps revealed serious
adverse cardiovascular effects. See Robert S. Bresalier, Robert S. Sandler, Hui Quan,
James A. Bolognese, Bettina Oxenius, Devin Horgan, Christopher Lines, Robert Riddell,
Dion Morton, Angel Lanas, Marvin A. Konstam, John A. Baron, for the Adenomatous
Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) Trial Investigators, Cardiovascular Events
Associated with Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, 352 N. ENG.
J. MED. 1092 (2005).
41
See THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 1, at 156 (“[Ninety-one] percent of
postmarketing commitments between 1990 and 2004 were requested by the agency rather
than being required by statute or regulation”).
42
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 gives the FDA the
authority to fine pharmaceutical manufacturers who fail to implement FDA-directed postapproval safety studies. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
43
See Stephen J. Schanz, Pharmaceutical Postmarket Review: Fact of Fiction, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 493, 494 (2007) (noting that the FDA can require a postmarketing
study (1) to verify clinical benefits of drug approved via the accelerated process, (2)
when a drug has been approved based only on animal studies, (3) for the purpose of
marketing a drug for use in children, (4) to determine if there are grounds to revoke
approval).
44
See Psaty, supra note 32, at 1753.
45
See Jerry Avorn, Paying for Drug Approvals—Who’s Using Whom?, 356 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1697, 1698 (2007) (presenting data on the status of open commitments for
postmarketing studies requested by the FDA, as of September 30, 2006, as reported in the
Federal Register).
46
Sage, supra note 23, at 990.
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percent of adverse drug reactions could be predicted, most of
which could be prevented by further study. 47
The FDA primarily relies on analyses of adverse drug reactions
over a long time frame to reveal additional risks of approved
pharmaceuticals, even though such reactions are underreported and
fail to establish causation. 48 As explained in the next section,
systematic evaluation of pharmaceutical safety during the postapproval period would reveal risks earlier, and with greater
confidence of accuracy, thereby reducing harm to patients.
B. Some Risks of FDA-Approved Pharmaceuticals Are
Discoverable by Postmarket Research
A review of data on adverse drug reactions suggests that
clinical studies performed with the purpose of evaluating the risk
of some of those reactions would have revealed them earlier. The
following are just a few examples of pharmaceuticals for which
post-approval testing may have revealed important safety data.
Vioxx (rofecoxib), a product of Merck & Co., Inc., is a
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (“NSAID”), 49 which was
FDA-approved in 1999 to treat pain associated primarily with
osteoarthritis. 50 Although there were early indications of serious
adverse cardiovascular events associated with use of Vioxx, Merck
asserted that the data was inconclusive. 51 Based on increased risk
47

See MILTON MORRIS SILVERMAN & PHILIP LEE, PILLS, PROFITS AND POLITICS 266
(University of California Press, 1974).
48
See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
49
See Chronic Pain Medical Glossary, http://www.pbs.org/secondopinion/episodes/
chronicpain/medicalglossary/story425.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2008) (defining NSAID
as a “[c]lass of medication, which does not contain steroids, that is often used as the
initial pharmacological therapy for common inflammation . . .”).
50
See Letter from Dr. Robert J. DeLap to Dr. Robert E. Silverman (May 20, 1999) (on
file with the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/99/021042_52_vioxx_appltr.pdf.
51
See Claire Bombardier, Loren Laine, Alise Reicin, Deborah Shapiro, Ruben BurgosVargas, Barry Davis, Richard Day, Marcos Bosi Ferraz, Christopher J. Hawkey, Marc C.
Hochberg, Tore K. Kvien, Thomas J. Schnitzer, for The VIGOR Study Group,
Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients
with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1520, 1523, 1526–27 (2000) (asserting
that the apparent elevation in cardiovascular events with Vioxx use are consistent with a
cardioprotective effect in the naproxen arm of the study).
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of adverse cardiovascular events revealed during a study for a new
use of the drug, Vioxx was voluntarily withdrawn from the market
in 2004. 52 At about the same time, a study to determine the cancer
prevention effects of Celebrex, Pfizer’s competing drug in the
same class, revealed similar cardiovascular risks. 53 “Many drugsafety researchers believe . . . that appropriately conducted studies
would have revealed the cardiovascular toxicity of [Vioxx] well
before the end of its 5-year run.” 54 A centralized data network 55
could have detected a risk of serious cardiovascular events
associated with Vioxx after less than three months, allowing for
the recommendation of targeted follow-up research. 56
With Rezulin (troglitazone), concerns about a risk of liver
toxicity prior to FDA approval57 might have suggested the need for
post-approval safety research.
Rezulin, a Warner-Lambert
product, was FDA-approved in 1997 for the treatment of Type II
diabetes. 58 Continued Rezulin use in over a million people
revealed a high occurrence of acute liver toxicity amongst users.59
In March 2000, the FDA requested that the manufacturer withdraw

52

See FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Vioxx as its Manufacturer Voluntarily
Withdraws the Product, FDA NEWS, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/
2004/NEW01122.html.
53
Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, and Paul
J. Seligman, Director, Office of Pharmacoepidemiology and Statistical Science, to NDA
files 20-998, 21-156, 21-341, 21-042, at 4 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cox2/nsaiddecisionmemo.pdf.
54
Avorn, supra note 45, at 1699.
55
This would be a mechanism of systematically collecting, collating, and analyzing
adverse events associated with a drug in order to identify a potential risk which could be
addressed by a postmarket study.
56
Mark McClellan, Drug Safety Reform at the FDA—Pendulum Swing or Systematic
Improvement?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1700, 1702 (2007) (citing R. Platt, The Future of
Drug Safety—Challenges for FDA, Presentation at the Institute of Medicine Forum,
Washington, DC (Mar. 12, 2007)).
57
See Rezulin to Be Withdrawn from the Market, HHS NEWS, Mar. 21, 2000,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00721.html.
58
See Drug Approvals for August 1997 (Oct. 3, 1997), http://www.fda.gov/cder/
da/da0897.htm.
59
David Willman, FDA Urged to Heed Warnings on Rezulin, L.A. TIMES, May 23,
1999, at A4.
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Rezulin from the market. 60 Focused postmarket clinical research
conducted at the onset of FDA-approval could have saved lives. 61
Unlike Vioxx or Rezulin, there were few concerns about the
safety of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”) when
they first came on the market. SSRIs were thought to be a safer
alternative to other classes of antidepressants. 62 SSRIs are a class
of antidepressant drugs used to treat major depressive disorder
(“MDD”) and other psychiatric disorders. 63 The first SSRI
approved by the FDA in 1987 was Prozac (fluoxetine),
manufactured by Eli Lilly. 64 By 1990, there was some indication
that patients prescribed SSRIs were prone to suicidal ideation. 65
While there were a number of subsequent reports of suicidal
ideation associated with SSRI use in depressed patients, 66 the
60
See Rezulin to Be Withdrawn from the Market, HHS NEWS, Mar. 21, 2000,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00721.html.
61
See Holcomb B. Noble, Removal of Diabetes Drug Meets with Mixed Feelings, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at F7 (noting that sixty-three people had died from Rezulin use
prior to the FDA’s request of withdrawal of Rezulin from the market).
62
See, e.g., Gerald Gartlehner et al., Comparative Benefits and Harms of SecondGeneration Antidepressants: Background Paper for the American College of Physicians,
149 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 734, 734 (2008).
63
See FDA Public Health Advisory, Suicidality in Children and Adolescents Being
Treated With Antidepressant Medications (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/
drug/antidepressants/SSRIPHA200410.htm.
64
See Andrew E. Falsetti, Fluoxetine-Induced Suicidal Ideation: An Examination of
the Medical Literature, Case Law, and the Legal Liability of Drug Manufacturers, 57
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 273, 274 (2002). Other SSRIs include Zoloft (sertraline), Paxil
(paroxetine), Luvox (fluvoxamine), Celexa (citalopram), and Lexapro (excitalopram
oxalate). Id.
65
See Martin H. Teicher, Carol Glod & Jonathan O. Cole, Emergence of Intense
Suicidal Preoccupation During Fluoxetine Treatment, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 207, 207–
10 (1990).
66
See, e.g., Timothy D. Brewerton, Fluoxetine-Induced Suicidality, Serotonin, and
Seasonality, 30 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 190, 190–96 (1991); Guy Chouinard,
Fluoxetine and Preoccupation with Suicide, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1258, 1258–59
(1991); John Downs et al., Preoccupation with Suicide in Patients Treated with
Fluoxetine, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1090, 1090–91 (1991); Cynthia E. Hoover,
Additional Cases of Suicidal Ideation Associated with Fluoxetine, 147 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1570, 1570–71 (1990); Laszlo A. Papp & Jack M. Gorman, Suicidal
Preoccupation During Fluoxetine Treatment, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1380, 1380 (1990);
Anthony J. Rothschild & Carol A. Locke, Reexposure to Fluoxetine After Serious Suicide
Attempts by Three Patients: The Role of Akathisia, 52 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 491, 491–
93 (1991); Gary D. Tollefson, Fluoxetine and Suicidal Ideation, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1691 (1990).
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reports seemed to be sparse compared to the number of patients
who had been prescribed an SSRI. 67 In part due to the paucity of
reports of suicidal ideation compared to the number of patients
taking SSRIs, but also because of confounding factors such as the
association of suicidal ideation with depression and concomitant
use of other medications in the affected patients, a link between
SSRIs and suicidal ideation could not be established without
controlled prospective studies. 68 Until 1997, the FDA maintained
that there was no credible link between SSRIs and suicidal
ideation, as a result of continued monitoring of adverse drug
reactions to SSRIs. 69
Although SSRIs were not initially approved for use in the
pediatric population, physicians prescribed SSRIs for children.70 It
was not until there were indications that children and adolescents
were vulnerable to suicidal ideation while taking SSRIs that the
FDA convened a group of experts to perform a meta-analysis of

67

See, e.g., Rothschild & Locke, supra note 66, at 493 (reporting on suicide ideation in
3 patients, of approximately 1500 treated). For comparison, suicide ideation appears in
the population of primary care patients at a prevalence of one to ten percent. See H.C.
Schulberg et al., Preventing Suicide in Primary Care Patients: The Primary Care
Physician’s Role, 26 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 337 (2004).
68
See S.R. Ahmad, USA: Fluoxetine “Not Linked to Suicide”, 338 LANCET 875, 875–
76 (1991); see also Tollefson, supra note 66, at 1692.
69
See Motus v. Pfizer, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing
FDA’s failure to find causal link between Prozac and suicidal ideation). Meta-analysis of
available data failed to demonstrate a link between SSRI prescription and suicidal
ideation. Marie-Therese Walsh & Timothy G. Dinan, Selective Serotonin Reuptake
Inhibitors and Violence: a Review of the Available Evidence, 104 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 84, 88 (2001).
70
See Rushton et al., Pediatrician and Family Physician Prescription of Selective
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, 105 PEDIATRICS e82, e82 (2000); Miller v. Pfizer, 196 F.
Supp. 2d 1095, 1104 (2002) (quoting Thomas Laughren, a senior FDA official, saying
“we have no data for [Zoloft] in children . . . and if this drug were to be approved, it is
likely that some clinicians will want to use this drug in children,” at a
Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee meeting); see also FDA, FDA
Proposed Medication Guide: About Using Antidepressants in Children or Teenagers,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/ssrimedicationguide.htm (updated May 2,
2007). A physician may legally prescribe FDA-approved drugs for non-FDA approved
uses if, in his judgment, the prescription is appropriate. This practice is called “off-label”
use. See James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 71 n.2 (1998).
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data from previous studies. 71 Analysis of previous studies
suggested a small risk of suicidal ideation in pediatric patients
prescribed SSRIs. 72 As a result, the FDA required changes to the
labeling of SSRIs to include warning statements “alert[ing] health
care providers to an increased risk of suicidality . . . in children and
adolescents.” 73
These examples demonstrate the value of systematic safety
research of pharmaceuticals in the post-approval period. Had these
drugs been so evaluated, risks would have been revealed sooner.
Timely changes to the warning labels or earlier withdrawal of the
drug from the market would have minimized harm to patients and
saved lives.
The next part of this Note explains why the costs involved in
pharmaceutical development, marketing, and ensuring consumer
safety are not adequately balanced by incentives to pharmaceutical
manufacturers to continue evaluating the safety of their drugs
subsequent to FDA approval.
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF REGULATION DISINCENTIVIZES
CONTINUED SAFETY TESTING OF PHARMACEUTICALS
In the pharmaceutical industry, the rewards of market
exclusivity guaranteed to a patented drug are dampened by the
length of time necessary to develop and evaluate the product for
safety and efficacy. A patent is awarded to an inventor of a
product or process to reward innovation with market exclusivity.74
Theoretically, the promise of market exclusivity spurs
Market exclusivity provides the
technological advances. 75
patentee (or licensee) with a limited time period during which

71

See FDA Public Health Advisory, Suicidality in Children and Adolescents Being
Treated with Antidepressant Medications (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/
antidepressants/SSRIPHA200410.htm.
72
See id.
73
See id.; see also FDA, Antidepressant Use in Children, Adolescents, and Adults
(May 2, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/default.htm .
74
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
75
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1597 (2003) (noting that one of the purposes of patent law is to encourage invention).
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competition in the market is reduced, thereby increasing the
potential profitability of the product. 76 As University of Chicago
School of Law Professor Richard Epstein notes, “[t]he medical
advances of the past 30 years are not just a matter of dumb luck.
They are very heavily dependent on the patent law, pricing
freedom, and marketing strategies that have allowed these firms to
bring a wide variety of vital products to market.” 77
Both the expense and duration of testing a drug to obtain FDA
approval for marketing impinges on the patent monopoly as the
drug cannot be sold prior to approval. 78 Thus, there is little
incentive for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to invest time and
money into safety testing beyond that required for FDA approval.
Yet, the FDA relies on pharmaceutical manufacturers to conduct
most of the research on the safety and efficacy of their
medications. 79 Once a drug is FDA-approved, there is little
economic incentive for a manufacturer to perform ongoing
postmarket testing 80 because information revealed by postmarket
testing has the potential of restricting the consumer base and does
little to protect against products liability suits.
This section discusses three economic reasons underpinning
the lack of additional safety testing of pharmaceuticals by their
manufacturers: (A) a desire not to impinge upon the exclusive
marketing period established by the patent grant, (B) desire not to
shrink the market for the drug, and (C) a failure of additional
testing to reduce the risk of products liability.

76
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 127 (4th ed. 2006) (“Patent law provides a market-driven incentive to invest in
innovation, by allowing the inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her
invention.”).
77
Epstein, supra note 4.
78
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
79
See Sage, supra note 23, at 1019.
80
See Jerry Avorn, Dangerous Deception—Hiding the Evidence of Adverse Drug
Effects, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2169, 2170 (2006) (“It is naïve to expect companies to
voluntarily fund studies that could sink lucrative products . . . .”).
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A. Desire Not to Lose Too Much Exclusivity Period
The Patent Act 81 grants the patentee the right to exclude others
from making, selling, or using the patented product for twenty
years from the filing date. 82 This exclusivity period provides
economic reward for innovation 83 by eliminating much of the
competition for a limited time period. 84 A patent does not grant
the right to market the patented product; 85 pharmaceuticals require
FDA approval prior to marketing. 86
Every new prescription drug requires FDA approval prior to
entry into interstate commerce. 87 The process between patenting a
potential new drug and FDA approval is lengthy and involves
considerable expense. The lag time between patenting and FDA
approval is typically ten to twelve years. 88 An application to the
FDA to market a new drug must follow “adequate and wellcontrolled” studies and provide “substantial evidence” of safety
and efficacy of the new drug. 89 In addition to laboratory research,
as many as sixty separate human trials may be required prior to
FDA approval. 90 This process erodes the patent term, leaving the
81

35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006).
Id. § 154(a)(2).
83
The impact of a shortened exclusivity period on pharmaceutical drug innovation is
discussed elsewhere and not the subject of this note. See, e.g., James J. Wheaton, Generic
Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 449–50 (1986).
84
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 76, at 126–27.
85
See Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584–85 (6th Cir. 1911) (“A
patent is not the grant of a right to make or use or sell. It does not, directly or indirectly,
imply any such right. It grants only the right to exclude others.”) Marketing of a
patented product could be blocked by a prior patent. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 202, 288 n.104 (D. Mass. 2004). A “blocking patent
situation” arises when an improvement is patented such that the original patent owner can
prevent the owner of the improvement patent from using the improved product. See id.
86
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
87
See id.
88
DENNIS S. FERNANDEZ & JAMES T. HUIE, STRATEGIC BALANCING OF PATENT AND
FDA
APPROVAL
PROCESSES
TO
MAXIMIZE
MARKET
EXCLUSIVITY
5,
http://www.iploft.com/PTO-FDA.pdf.
89
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412
U.S. 609, 617–18 (1973) (interpreting “adequate safety and efficacy testing” and
affirming the authority of the FDA to determine whether a drug has met the appropriate
standards for approval).
90
See Epstein, supra note 4.
82
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pharmaceutical manufacturer with a shorter period of market
exclusivity.
In addition, the cost of developing, patenting, and obtaining
government approval for a new drug can be staggering. Estimates
of the cost of taking a drug from discovery to market range from
$500 million to over $2 billion. 91 The cost of drug development is
correlated with the duration of the FDA approval process. That is,
when fewer human studies or human studies of shorter duration are
required for FDA approval of a drug, the cost of development is
lower. 92 Of course, a shorter FDA approval process leaves more
time of market exclusivity associated with the patent term as well.
The effect of the high cost of drug development is exacerbated
by the low rate of success. As few as one in ten thousand potential
drugs may reach the market. 93 Approximately ten percent of drugs
FDA-approved for testing in humans are approved for marketing. 94
Thus, a tiny fraction of drugs brought through the process of
discovery, patenting, and research and development make it
through FDA approval to marketing.
Following patent expiration, the profits generated from market
exclusivity associated with a new drug are severely diminished by
competition from generic products. 95 Because profitability of a
drug is greatest during the exclusivity period, there is strong
91

See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006) (estimating
the average cost of drug development to be between $839 and $868 million, but varies
from $479 million to $2.119 billion); J.A. DiMasi, R.W. Hansen & H.G. Grabowski, The
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151
(2003) (estimating the average cost of developing a drug at $802 million); Friedman,
supra note 33, at 560–62 (2004) (estimating the cost of bringing a drug to market at $900
million); David Noonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22, 26
(estimating the cost of developing a single new drug at over $500 million).
92
See Adams & Brantner, supra note 91, at 422 tbl.1.
93
See Office of Technology Assessment (U.S. Government Printing Office), The
Patent-Term Extension and the Pharmaceutical Industry 13 (Aug. 1981), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_5/DATA/1981/8119.pdf.
94
See id.
95
See John F. Niblack, Why are Drug Development Programs Growing in Size and
Cost? A View From the Industry, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 153 (1997) (“Sales of a
patented drug product by the original sponsor-innovator . . . can fall by fifty-to-eighty
percent in the first year following patent expiration . . . .”).
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motivation to reduce the portion of the patent term lost to the FDA
approval process. 96
Recognizing the tension between safety testing and patent
reward for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, 97 in 1984
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, 98 which includes a
provision for extending market exclusivity. 99 The Hatch-Waxman
Act allows the FDA to extend the term of one patent for a new
drug following approval of a New Drug Application (“NDA”) for
that drug to compensate for a portion of the time a drug is being
studied and reviewed for FDA approval, up to five years. 100
Partially as a result of this provision, the effective patent monopoly
of a pharmaceutical has increased from an average of 8.1 years in
1980 to fourteen years in 2000. 101 Still, there is a lag of about
eleven years between patent award and FDA approval for
marketing for the typical pharmaceutical. 102 During this time, the
patent has been disclosed and there is ample opportunity for
competitors to develop non-infringing competing products. 103
Loss of market exclusivity time, coupled with the potential for
competing products to emerge, prompts pharmaceutical
manufacturers to minimize the duration of pre-approval testing.
During the time period prior to FDA approval, the drug is not
profitable for the manufacturer because it is not being sold. In
addition, considerable funds are being expended for safety and
efficacy testing. 104 Moreover, the manufacturer is risking the
96

See FERNANDEZ & HUIE, supra note 88, at 6 (describing methods drug companies
use to reduce the portion of the patent term lost to the FDA approval process).
97
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156 and 271(e) (2006)).
99
See 35 U.S.C. § 156.
100
See id.
101
See PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH, RX R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE
INDUSTRY’S
R&D
“SCARE
CARD”
2
(2001),
available
at
DRUG
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF.
102
See FERNANDEZ & HUIE, supra note 88, at 1.
103
Once a patent has been issued, “[t]he specification, drawings and all papers relating
to the file . . . are open to inspection by the public.” PTO Records and Files of the Patent
and Trademark Office Rule, 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2008). This can alert competitors to a
new market or otherwise spur competitors to develop non-infringing competing products.
104
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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possibilities that the drug will prove insufficiently safe or effective
to obtain FDA approval and that a competing drug will come to the
market during this time. Further, the period of exclusivity is the
most profitable period for a pharmaceutical. 105 For these reasons,
a pharmaceutical manufacturer has considerable economic
motivation to minimize the time of pre-approval safety and
efficacy research. In fact, pharmaceutical manufacturers have
supported legislation to charge themselves user fees to supplement
resources to the FDA in order to expedite approval of new
drugs. 106 These economic factors disincentivize pharmaceutical
companies from performing studies, beyond those required for
FDA approval, if those studies would further delay introduction of
the drug to the market.
Once a drug is FDA-approved, the incentive to invest
additional time and financial resources in ongoing safety testing is
further diminished. Continued safety testing may provide little
economic reward. As explained in section B, pharmaceutical
manufacturers may be reluctant to perform additional studies that
may reveal risks that would shrink their potential market and,
thereby, further reduce the profitability of such drugs.
B. Desire Not to Shrink Market as Result of Narrowing Consumer
Base
When pharmaceutical manufacturers perform additional
research into the safety of their products, they risk revealing
information that may have the effect of narrowing their consumer
base. Risks associated with a drug may have a general negative
effect on the desire of patients to use that drug, even for those
people not at risk or for whom the drug confers a significant
benefit. For example, Tysabri (natalizumab), a drug used to
mitigate the symptoms of multiple sclerosis, was voluntarily
105

See Epstein, supra note 4.
See Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing,
Risk Signals, Preemption, and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347, 351
(2008). Many detractors of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act suggest that it causes the
FDA to be accountable to the pharmaceutical industry. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.); see also Avorn, supra note 45, at 1697.
106
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withdrawn from the market in 2005, after several incidences of
progressive
multifocal
leukoencephalopathy. 107
After
reintroduction of the drug onto the market in 2006, a survey of
multiple sclerosis patients indicated that more than half of those
using Tysabri would likely continue to take the drug if it were
shown to have a fatality risk of one in one-thousand; over fifteen
percent would likely continue to take the drug with a fatality risk
of one in one-hundred. 108 Although the actual risk of fatality may
be less than one in one-thousand, and the drug significantly
reduces multiple sclerosis symptoms, less than twenty-five percent
of patients who used Tysabri before its withdrawal from the market
resumed taking it after the drug was reintroduced. 109 In this case,
the news of a small (although serious) risk resulted in a seventyfive percent reduction in the use of a beneficial drug.
Such risks may also negatively affect physicians’ prescribing
behavior. 110 This would be especially true if there were similar
alternative drugs available. For example, Amgen lost thirty-two
percent of its share of the anemia drug market after its drug
Aranesp was associated with a risk of potentially fatal
cardiovascular events when administered at high doses, suggesting
physicians opted to prescribe alternative anemia drugs. 111 A
subsequent meta-analysis of a number of studies shows that
members of this class of drugs, which includes Johnson &
Johnson’s Procrit, increase the incidence of blood clots in cancer
patients being treated for anemia resulting from chemotherapy.112
Though all anemia treatments showed a drop in sales, the decline
107

Adelman et al., supra note 38.
See John E. Calfee, A Representative Survey of M.S. Patients on Attitudes Toward
the Benefits and Risks of Drug Therapy, 2006 AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REG.
STUD. 10, available at http://www.issuelab.org/click/download2/representative_survey
_of_ms_patients_on_attitudes_toward_the_benefits_and_risks_of_drug_therapy/ms_pati
ent_attitudes.pdf.
109
See Toni Clarke, Patients, Doctors Still Leery of Biogen’s MS Drug, REUTERS, Oct.
23,
2006,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/
idUSN2338680720061023.
110
See, e.g., id.
111
See Reuters, Anemia Drugs May Raise Risk of Death, BOSTON.COM, Feb. 27, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2008/02/27/anemia_drugs_may_raise
_risk_of_death/.
112
Id.
108
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in sales for Aranesp in 2007 was more than two-fold that of the
other marketed anemia drugs. 113
Similarly, the competitive battle between the cox-2 inhibitors,
Vioxx and Celebrex, may have contributed to Merck’s reluctance
to perform the studies to address the potential cardiovascular risks
of Vioxx. 114 Although both drugs are in the same class of cox-2
inhibitors and presumably have similar cardiovascular risks, 115 a
demonstration of cardiovascular risk associated with Vioxx, but
not Celebrex, might have been expected to result in a reduction of
the market share for Vioxx.
The potential economic impact of safety studies revealing a
risk that would reduce the consumer base serves as an economic
disincentive for performing such studies. If the direct expenses
and the expense of the effects of additional safety testing were
counter-balanced by a reduction in expenses associated with
defending products liability suits, such testing might prove
economically advantageous. However, as discussed in the next
section, the cost of products liability risk may not be reduced by
additional safety testing.
C. Expense of Additional Testing Not Balanced by Cost of
Products Liability Risk
Of course, the safety and efficacy testing required for FDA
approval is necessary to ensure consumer safety. 116 However,
FDA approval does not ensure the safety of the drug. 117
Continuing use of a drug amongst a heterogeneous population can
113

Id.
See Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and
Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 942 (2007). Cardiovascular risks of Vioxx
were revealed by studies to demonstrate increased gastrointestinal safety of Vioxx
compared to less specific pain relievers and studies for additional uses of the drug. See id.
at 948. Similar studies were never performed on Celebrex. See id. at 945.
115
See Barry Meier et al., Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain
Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at A2; Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, M.D. &
Paul J. Seligman, M.D., M.P.H. through Steen Galson, M.D., M.P.H. 10 (Apr. 6, 2005),
(finding
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/NSAIDdecisionMemo.pdf
Celebrex and Vioxx are “associated with an increased risk of serious CV events”).
116
See Meadows, supra note 15.
117
See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
114
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reveal risks that were not made apparent by earlier human
studies. 118 Moreover, the nature of pharmaceuticals is such that a
pharmaceutical product can never be “safe” by ordinary standards
of product liability. 119 Pharmaceuticals work by interacting with
the human body. As a result of variation within the human
population, each individual is unique such that a “safe”
pharmaceutical may cause undesirable effects in individuals with
certain common characteristics 120 as well as undesirable
idiosyncratic effects in unique individuals. 121
Many pharmaceutical products liability cases are based on
information that becomes apparent subsequent to initial FDA
approval for marketing. 122 Theoretically, the threat of products
liability is an attempt to correct for imperfect information. 123 By
“promoting information development,” the threat of products
liability increases the safety of the product. 124 In other words, the
potential for liability for foreseeable risks considering the state of
the art at the time of sale motivates pharmaceutical companies to
identify risks, via continuing study, and warn of those risks. 125
118

See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve supra note 18, at 597–99; see also Sage,
supra note 23.
119
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (“The issue of
foreseeability of risk of harm is more complex in the case of products such as
prescription drugs . . . .”).
120
See Funmilayo O. Ajayi et al., Adverse Drug Reactions: A Review of Relevant
Factors, 40 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1093, 1094 (2000) (explaining that adverse
effects of drugs in certain segments of the population are not revealed prior to marketing
because pre-approval clinical trials often fail to account for differences among patient
groups in terms of age, gender, and other factors which may be common to specific
groups).
121
See id. at 1095 (“[G]enetic variability . . . may explain unexpected toxicity
demonstrated in some individuals after administration of a usual therapeutic dose [of a
drug].”); Sage, supra note 23.
122
See Sage, supra note 23, at 1015–16 (discussing the lack of availability of
appropriate information when drugs come on the market, as well as other factors,
contributing to the incidence of adverse events resulting in products liability cases).
123
See id. at 1015.
124
See id. at 1016.
125
See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (indicating
“there is no duty to warn of unknown or unforeseeable risks”); Feldman v. Lederle Labs.,
479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (limiting liability to risks that were “reasonably knowable”).
For a discussion of the behavioral effects of products liability, see Steven Shavell,
Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
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Although continued use of a pharmaceutical product over time
in a large heterogeneous population may reveal adverse effects that
were not apparent at the time of FDA approval, without continued
rigorous study it is difficult to evaluate the accumulated data.126
The result is disagreement as to the significance of the adverse
events. At one extreme, the adverse events reveal a risk of drug
use that the manufacturer fails to include in the product labeling.127
Alternatively, the adverse events may be idiosyncratic 128 or may
result from consumer misuse. 129
However, there may be
insufficient information to determine whether there is a risk. 130
These alternatives are resolvable by continuing post-approval
safety evaluation of the drug.
Nonetheless, products liability suits may be brought despite
clear evaluation and ongoing postmarketing regulatory approval by
the FDA and compliance by the pharmaceutical manufacturer. The
paradigmatic example is that of Bendectin.
Bendectin was an anti-nausea drug prescribed to pregnant
women. 131
Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer, Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, alleging that Bendectin caused birth defects, 132
even though physicians, scientists and the FDA claimed
otherwise. 133 After fifteen years, over $100 million in litigation
expenses, and losing about forty percent of the cases against it,
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals removed Bendectin from the

126

See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. to Expand Scrutiny of Risks from Drugs After They're
Approved for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A17.
127
See supra text accompanying note 19.
128
That is, the reaction to the drug may be due to an individual characteristic of the user
that fails to indicate a subgroup of individuals sensitive to the drug. See supra note 121
and accompanying text.
129
Consumer misuse may include, for example, misprescribing by the physician, error
in dispensing by the pharmacy, and/or misdosing by the physician and/or patient. See
Otero et al., supra note 25.
130
See Sage, supra note 23, at 1015.
131
See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
132
See id. at 4.
133
See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the
Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 477 (1997); Lars Noah, Triage in the
Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C.
L. REV. 741, 760 (2003).
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market. 134 The Bendectin story demonstrates how, even in the
absence of data demonstrating an unsafe product, pharmaceutical
manufacturers are not shielded from products liability or products
liability litigation.
Such suits disincentivize pharmaceutical
manufacturers from postmarket safety testing because evidence of
safety has little economic value if it does not reduce the costs of
litigation and liability.
In addition, compliance with FDA recommendations does not
protect a pharmaceutical manufacturer from products liability.
Several state courts apply strict liability standards for failure to
warn, even when the pharmaceutical manufacturer has no
knowledge of risk 135 and other states apply strict liability standards
when the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk. 136
The result is that pharmaceutical manufacturers bear high costs of
product liability even when some risks are unknown or known and
not adequately included in warnings approved by the FDA.
Under the current regulatory system, the benefit of continued
testing is increased safety to the consumer due to better product
labeling. One might expect a safer product to benefit the
manufacturer with both increased profits due to increased sales or
higher pricing and reduced costs due to decreased liability. On the
contrary, knowledge of increased risks results in decreased sales of
particular drugs, in part because of fears of liability by physicians

134

See Green, supra note 133; Noah, supra note 133.
See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1106–07 (Colo. 1976) (“[A]
manufacturer who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
consumer is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused, even though the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.”); see also
Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600 So.2d 701, 707 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992) (“A
manufacturer's liability for harm caused by ‘unreasonably dangerous per se’ products
may be imposed solely on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of a product
irrespective of the manufacturer's intent, knowledge or conduct.”).
136
See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 392 (1984) (applying strict
liability when Lederle knew of the risk of tooth discoloration, but failed to warn on
advice of FDA); see also Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Cal. 1996)
(“The California courts, either expressly or by implication, have to date required
knowledge, actual or constructive, of potential risk or danger before imposing strict
liability for a failure to warn.”).
135
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who opt not to prescribe. 137 In addition, disclosure of additional
adverse effects narrows the appropriate market for the drug. 138
Moreover, when pharmaceutical manufacturers reveal additional
adverse effects of a drug, the result may be increased costs of
defending products liability suits, 139 regardless of the outcome.
Over time, liability risks of marketed drugs increase. The
greater the use of the drug, the more likely adverse reactions will
be reported, 140 resulting in stricter FDA warnings and/or restriction
of marketing. Products liability suits based on actual harm,
potential harm, or failure to warn adequately of the drugs’ side
effects frequently follow. Defending these suits is immensely
expensive and the outcomes are unpredictable. 141 Thus, the
considerable expense of postmarket study would not likely be
balanced by an economic benefit to the manufacturer derived from
a reduction in products liability litigation.
The economic effects of the current regulatory and legal
system disincentivizes pharmaceutical companies from performing
safety testing of their products beyond that required for FDA
approval. Since the period of market exclusivity enjoyed by a
pharmaceutical is reduced by the length of time necessary to
develop and evaluate a product for FDA approval, pharmaceutical
manufacturers are motivated to reduce the expense and duration of
pre-approval testing. Moreover, the expense of postmarket testing
is not balanced by economic reward. To the contrary, information
revealed by postmarket testing may reduce the consumer base and
fail to reduce the expense of defending against products liability
suits. Thus, under the current system, additional safety testing of
137

See, e.g., Anemia Drugs May Raise Risk of Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2008/02/27/anemia_drugs_may_raise
_risk_of_death/ (discussing decrease in sales of Aranesp, in part due to physicians’
reluctance to prescribe the drug following a study showing increased risk of blood clots).
138
See Green, supra note 133, at 497 (“[W]idespread use of a newly approved drug
may also provide new information that has implications for expanding or narrowing
indications for use . . . .”).
139
See id. at 468.
140
See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve supra note 18, at 597–99; see also Sage,
supra note 23.
141
See, e.g., supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text (discussing that, despite a
strong consensus that Bendectin was safe, Merrell Dow spent over $100 million
defending product liability suits with unpredictable outcomes).
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pharmaceuticals may actually be economically disadvantageous to
a manufacturer. A system which provides an economic reward for
post-approval safety testing would spur such research. Part III
proposes a system to reward post-approval safety testing of
marketed pharmaceuticals with an extension of the period of
market exclusivity.
III. SOLUTION: INCENTIVIZE POST-APPROVAL SAFETY TESTING
WITH EXTENSION OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY
Potential for profit controls the incentive to invest money in
research and development. 142 Profit is potentially greatest during
periods of exclusivity. 143 Extending the period of exclusivity,
because it increases profits, will encourage investment in research
and development. In particular, it provides economic incentive for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to voluntarily continue evaluation of
the safety of the drugs they manufacture and market.

A. The Proposal
This Note proposes an extension of the period of exclusivity
for completion of targeted research requested by or approved by
the FDA. 144 Concerns about the risks of an FDA-approved drug
raised by pre-approval data, reports of adverse drug reactions, or
new scientific information could be addressed by carefully planned
prospective human studies. Such studies could be initiated by the
drug manufacturer in response to an FDA request to perform such
studies and approval of the study design by the FDA.
Alternatively, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may initiate the
142

See Timothy J. McCoy, Biomedical Process Patents: Should They Be Restricted by
Ethical Limitations?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 512 (1992) (explaining profitability of an
economic monopoly “drives innovation and capital investment in research and
development . . . .”).
143
See Epstein, supra note 4; FERNANDEZ & HUIE, supra note 88, at 1.
144
Adverse events, internal research or published research may suggest to the
manufacturer the desirability of additional safety studies. A manufacturer should be
allowed to seek FDA approval to perform and complete such studies in exchange for
extension of the exclusivity period as well.
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process by requesting approval of a qualifying study design by the
FDA. Under this proposal, pharmaceutical manufacturers who
complete the FDA approved postmarketing studies and submit
their data to the FDA would be rewarded by an extension of the
market exclusivity period. 145 The economic incentive of the
reward of an extension of the exclusivity period would
complement the current punishment structure for failure to perform
requested studies, included in the recent Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007. 146 Thus, in addition to
fines for failure to comply with FDA-mandated post-approval
studies, pharmaceutical manufacturers would have economic
incentives to identify and perform studies, which may or may not
originate with the FDA. In that way, this proposal is broader than
the current punishment structure because it has the potential to
stimulate the performance of a larger set of appropriate studies.
In addition, this Note proposes including a provision permitting
FDA approval of third-party safety testing when manufacturers
decline to perform FDA-requested studies. Inclusion of a thirdparty safety testing provision would increase the likelihood of
postmarket study. Manufacturers would be more cooperative in
performing requested postmarket studies because of the potential
of FDA-approved third-party research revealing the necessity for
additional warnings of risk without the advantage of the reward of
the extension of the exclusivity period. Third-parties could be

145

The length of time of the increase in the market exclusivity period is not the subject
of this Note. There are valid reasons for both longer and shorter time frames. In
addition, whether a manufacturer could receive multiple extensions for multiple studies
on the same pharmaceutical would have to be considered because new safety issues may
arise for the same drug. Moreover, some consideration is warranted for extending market
exclusivity for all pharmaceuticals with the active ingredient tested. This proposal differs
from that of Alastair Wood in that the reward would be for performing the study and
sharing the data, and not for producing a “preferred and predefined safety outcome.”
Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process, 355
N. ENG. J. MED. 618, 620 (2006). Also, this proposal differs in that the length of the
exclusivity period would not be keyed to the financial risk of drug development. Id. at
621–22.
146
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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incentivized to perform requested postmarket studies by provision
of funding for such studies. 147
B. Extension of Exclusivity is a Successful Incentive
Implementation of the proposal to stimulate postmarket safety
testing of pharmaceuticals by offering a reward of an extension of
the exclusive marketing period, described in Part III.A, is likely to
have the desired effect. Previous implementation of a similar
process addressing safety of pharmaceuticals in the pediatric
population serves as a positive example that extension of the
exclusive marketing period is adequate incentive to stimulate
research.
To stimulate pharmaceutical manufacturers to test drugs for
pediatric use, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act (“FDAMA”), 148 passed by Congress in 1997, included a
provision for extending market exclusivity for manufacturers who
evaluated their drug for safety and efficacy in children. 149 The
problem addressed by this Act was the prescription of drugs to
children despite the lack of adequate dosing, safety and efficacy
data for the pediatric population. 150
Because children are
147

Like the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, third parties could be attracted to
perform the appropriate studies by earmarking NIH funds for such studies and
announcing Requests for Applications (“RFAs”). See Best Pharmaceuticals for Children
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, § 3(3), 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 290b (2006)).
148
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat.
2296 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–92 (Supp. 1997)).
149
21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2000). The main provision, of extension of exclusivity as a
reward for evaluation in the pediatric population, was renewed with The Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (“BPCA”), passed by Congress in 2002. See generally
Holly Fernandez Lynch, Give Them What They Want? The Permissibility of Pediatric
Placebo-Controlled Trials Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, 16 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 79 (2007).
150
Over sixty-five percent of drugs prescribed to children are approved for use only in
adults. See Lynch, supra note 149, at 82; see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Committee on
Drugs, Guidelines for the Ethical Conduct of Studies to Evaluate Drugs in Pediatric
Populations, 95 PEDIATRICS 286, 286 (1995) (noting eighty-one percent of drugs in the
1991 Physicians’ Desk Reference warn that use in children was not determined to be safe
or effective or restrict their use to narrow age groups); Rosemary Roberts, What’s So
Special About Children?, Presented at the American College of Toxicology
22nd Annual Meeting (Nov. 6, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/
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physiologically different from adults, they sometimes respond
differently to drugs. 151
Until the FDAMA, pharmaceutical
manufacturers had little economic incentive to perform safety and
efficacy studies for pediatric prescription of their drugs. 152
Pediatric trials were not required for FDA approval. 153
Manufacturers could avoid liability for adverse reactions in
children by not marketing their drugs for pediatric use and
including a warning that the drug had not been evaluated for
pediatric use in its product labeling, even though off-label use was
permitted. 154
The FDAMA provided economic incentive for a
pharmaceutical manufacturer to conduct safety and efficacy
testing, in the pediatric population, of an FDA-approved drug by
rewarding such studies with a six month extension of market
exclusivity for all products with the active ingredient studied. 155
The reward of the extension of exclusivity is granted in exchange
for reporting study data and does not depend on the outcome of the
study. 156 Under the 2002 revision of the Best Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act (“BPCA”), 157 the FDA can approve the establishment
of a private foundation, to support third party research on drugs

pediatric/presentation/tox_peds_nov2001/sld005.htm (indicating lack of information for
pediatric use for about three-quarters of prescription drugs).
151
For example, aspirin can cause serious illness in children with chickenpox or
influenza; barbiturates are relaxants in adults, but stimulants in children; amphetamines
stimulate adults, but relax children. See Rebecca D. Williams, How to Give Medicine to
Children, 30 FDA CONSUMER 6, 8–9 (Jan.–Feb. 1996).
152
See Christopher-Paul Milne, Exploring the Frontiers of Law and Science: FDAMA’s
Pediatric Studies Incentive, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 491, 491–93 (2002).
153
See Specific Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drugs; Proposed Revision of “Pediatric Use” Subsection in the Labeling, 57
Fed. Reg. 47,423 (Oct. 16, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201).
154
See Lauren Hammer Breslow, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002:
The Rise of the Voluntary Incentive Structure and Congressional Refusal to Require
Pediatric Testing, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 133, 142 (2003); see also Miller v. Pfizer, 196
F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1106 (2002). Pfizer avoided liability for child’s suicide while taking
Zoloft, in part, because the drug had not been tested in children and was clearly labeled
“[s]afety and effectiveness in children have not been established.” Id.
155
See Milne, supra note 152, at 491.
156
See generally Breslow, supra note 154, at 155–56.
157
Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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that do not undergo manufacturer-performed pediatric testing. 158
This can even be done during the patent term. 159
As of March 2004, 346 requests to evaluate prescription drugs
for pediatric use were received from pharmaceutical
manufacturers, 6 months of exclusivity granted for 97 drugs, and
new labels approved for 70. 160
These data indicate that
pharmaceutical companies are induced to perform safety testing in
exchange for a promise of extended exclusivity of marketing, as
proposed in Part III.A of this Note. Alternative solutions,
discussed in Part III.C of this Note, have proved inadequate to
address pharmaceutical safety because they are responsive to harm
already caused, do not provide sufficient economic incentive to
perform postmarket safety studies, and do not stimulate research
focused on specific questions of product safety.
C. Alternative Solutions Do Not Work
1. Products Liability is Insufficient to Ensure Safety
Products liability is invoked as a mechanism to incentivize
pharmaceutical companies to perform the safety studies necessary
to avoid the expense of liability and litigation. 161 However, the
threat of litigation and potential liability has not proven sufficient
to stimulate voluntary postmarket studies addressing drug safety
because the risk of litigation and liability for failure to warn of
adverse responses to a drug does not necessarily correlate to the
potential for injury due to drug use. 162 As noted above, the cost of
litigation and liability for Bendectin was considerable, despite over

158

42 U.S.C. § 290b (2006).
21 U.S.C. § 355a(n)(1)(A) (2006).
160
See Rosemary Roberts, FDA Perspective on FDAMA: Successes, Failures; Future
Directions,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/presentation/FDAMA-FDA%20PerspRoberts2004/sld008.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). As of Feb. 19, 2008, 145 drugs
have been granted pediatric exclusivity. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Drugs to Which
FDA has Granted Pediatric Exclusivity for Pediatric Studies under Section 505A of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/exgrant.htm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
161
See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
162
See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.
159
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thirty-five scientific studies demonstrating no elevated risk of birth
defects with use of the drug. 163
In addition, products liability cases have resulted in the
unavailability of pharmaceuticals that may have beneficial effects
which outweigh risks in, at least, a portion of the population. 164
For example, Bendectin, the only anti-nausea drug available for
pregnant women in 1983, was voluntarily removed from the
market because of the costs associated with products liability
litigation. 165 Choices of female contraceptives are limited because
of withdrawal of some contraceptive products from the market and
disinterest in contraceptive research and development because of
liability concerns. 166 A recombinant Lyme disease vaccine was
withdrawn from the market because a series of product liability
cases resulted in bad publicity, causing a drop in demand even
though the adverse events litigated over were never shown to be
caused by the vaccine. 167
An unintended effect of products liability cases is a loss of
confidence in the safety of drugs individuals are prescribed. In the
wake of products liability cases revealing serious risks of
commonly used drugs, approximately twenty percent of adults
163

See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1354–56 (6th Cir. 1992)
(summarizing the results of six typical clinical studies showing no statistically significant
increase in birth defects amongst over 5,000 women prescribed Bendectin during
pregnancy compared to those who were not).
164
The potential for products liability may also discourage new product development,
resulting in social harm caused by the absence of product availability. See Sage, supra
note 23, at 990.
165
See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988).
166
See David Hubacher, The Checkered History and Bright Future of Intrauterine
Contraception in the United States, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 98, 98
(Mar.–Apr. 2002) (suggesting that limited availability and use of the intrauterine device
in the United States is due to withdrawal of products from the market in the 1970s and
1980s, reluctance of companies to develop new devices, as well as other factors not
entertained in this paper); Sheldon Segal, Introduction, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 329, 330–31 (1997).
167
See Allison Abbott, Lyme Disease: Uphill Struggle, 439 NATURE 524, 524 (2006)
(reporting that products liability suits and bad publicity caused GlaxoSmith Kline to pull
the vaccine from the market); Emma Hitt, Poor Sales Trigger Vaccine Withdrawal, 8
NATURE MED. 311 (2002); see also Editorial, When a Vaccine is Safe, 439 NATURE 509
(2006) (reporting that rumors of nonexistent side effects of the vaccine forced it from the
market).
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regularly taking medication worry about the dangers of the drugs
they are taking; thirteen percent stop using drugs prescribed to
them; four percent reduce the dosage of drugs they are taking. 168
Consumer choice to stop using or to reduce the dosage of
prescription medications can have serious negative consequences
to their health.
On the other hand, products liability litigation may encourage
the inclusion of unwarranted warnings that go beyond what is
required by the FDA. 169 Such suits do not constitute a prospective
well-designed study enabling the determination of specific risks
that could be adequately warned against in product labeling. 170
More importantly, the delay in revelation of information
between FDA approval and products liability cases results in injury
to individuals. For example, an FDA epidemiologic study revealed
that in the five years Vioxx was marketed, the use of Vioxx over
Celebrex resulted in 27,785 excess acute myocardial infarctions
and sudden cardiac deaths. 171
While products liability suits allow individuals harmed by
unsafe drugs to be compensated for their injuries, they do not
replace well-designed prospective studies which might have the
effect of reducing harm to patients. Rewarding postmarket safety
studies of pharmaceuticals with an extension of the exclusive
marketing period, as this Note proposes, would incentivize
168

See Harris Interactive, The Public Has Doubts About the Pharmaceutical Industry’s
Willingness to Publish Safety Information About Their Drugs in a Timely Manner,
HARRIS POLL, at 1 (Jan. 18, 2005), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/
news/newsletters/wsjhealthnews/WSJOnline_HI_Health-CarePoll2005vol4_iss01.pdf
(online poll of 2,404 US adults conducted in January 2005).
169
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biologic Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,921, 3,935 (Jan. 24, 2006); Gilhooley, supra note 106,
at 353.
170
See Gilhooley, supra note 106, at 353. (“Product liability suits are a less-than-ideal
vehicle for determining what type of warning is needed and involve a retrospective
determination that the drug sponsor did not do enough.”).
171
Memorandum from David J. Graham, Associate Director of Science, Office of Drug
Safety to Paul Seligman, Acting Director, Office of Drug Safety, Risk of Acute
Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death in Patients Treated with COX-2
Selective and Non-Selective NSAIDs 9 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/DRUG/infopage/vioxx/vioxxgraham.pdf (last visited Feb. 11,
2008).
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pharmaceutical companies to design studies targeted at elucidating
specific risks associated with the drugs studied.
2. Fines Become Cost of Doing Business
The FDA has the ability to request post-approval studies of
pharmaceuticals. 172 Until recently, however, because the agency
had no enforcement power, these studies went largely
unperformed. 173 Recent amendment to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act allows the FDA to fine manufacturers who fail to
This
perform requested post-approval safety testing. 174
mechanism of enforcement has not yet been tested. However, the
maximum fine of $10 million 175 is only a small percentage of the
average cost of drug development. 176 Manufacturers may risk the
possibility of a fine being levied because the expense of a fine may
be less than the expense of research and the effect of risks revealed
on the marketing of the pharmaceutical. That is, the fine may
become the cost of doing business.
3. Strengthening Requirements for FDA Approval is Too
Costly
An alternative to postmarketing research, is to increase the
extent of safety and efficacy studies required for initial FDA
approval. Such studies, however, would result in added delay in
introducing beneficial drugs to the market. 177 In addition,
increasing the scope and number of pre-approval studies would
increase the cost of drug development, while the time delay in
introduction of the drug to the market would decrease profits.
These conditions decrease manufacturers’ incentives to develop
new drugs.
172

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(A) (Supp. 2007); supra notes 44–45 and accompanying

text.
173

See Avorn, supra note 45, at 1699 and accompanying text.
Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
175
21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)(A)(ii).
176
The average cost of drug development is about $800 million. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
177
Sean M. Basquill, Prescription Drug Liability and Postmarketing Surveillance: A
Modest Proposal, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 69, 76–77 (2006).
174
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As one court recognized, “[p]ublic policy favors the
development and marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though
some risks . . . might accompany their introduction, because drugs
can save lives and reduce pain and suffering.” 178 Increasing the
extent of research required for FDA approval may delay access to
beneficial drug therapies 179 due to the increased time necessary to
perform these additional studies. A cost/benefit analysis of impact
of a reduction in drug review time resulting from implementation
of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (“PDUFA”) 180 suggested an
overall increase in the health of the population represented by a
total increase of 180,000 to 310,000 life-years. 181 These data
suggest that a delay in approval time might have a negative impact
on the health of the population.
The negative impact of delayed FDA approval may not be
sufficiently balanced by increased safety of FDA-approved drugs.
Additional pre-approval safety testing may fail to reveal some
risks. 182 For many drugs, the potential risks are revealed during
the post-approval period. 183 Without the insight of potential risk
revealed via post-approval use, targeted studies could not be
designed. In addition, whatever studies are implemented in the
pre-approval period would not address any risks that remain
unanticipated. The incentive to study risks revealed in the postapproval period would not only be lacking, but would be
diminished because of the further loss of exclusive marketing time
due to the increased pre-approval period. This problem is
178

Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988).
See Basquill, supra note 177, at 76–77.
180
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (providing for the FDA to charge a fee to
a prescription drug manufacturer for the FDA approval process). The recent fee was
increased in order to provide necessary resources to the FDA in order to shorten the
approval period. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act Meeting Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 1743,
1746–47 (Jan. 16, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/Dockets/98fr/07122.htm.
181
See Tomas J. Philipson, Ernst R. Berndt, Adrian H.B. Gottschalk & Matthew W.
Strobeck, Assessing the Safety and Efficacy of the FDA: The Case of the Prescription
Drug User Fee Acts 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11724,
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11724.
182
See Basquill, supra note 177, at 76–77.
183
See Struve, supra note 18, at 598–99 and accompanying footnotes.
179
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addressed by the proposal, in Part III.A, to incentivize postapproval safety testing targeted at elucidating potential risks
revealed during the postmarket period, without delaying the
introduction of pharmaceuticals approved for use.
4. Tax Incentives Are Not Focused on the Problem
While tax incentives have been used to affect behavior in
numerous industries, 184 there are a number of disadvantages to
utilizing a tax incentive 185 to increase safety testing of
pharmaceuticals. First, there is the political concern about giving a
tax incentive to an extremely profitable industry. Second, the loss
of tax revenue would increase the tax burden (or alternatively
reduce services) to the entire populace. Third, there would be no
simple mechanism for matching the tax incentive to where the
research would have the most beneficial effect. That is, it would
be difficult to target the specific pharmaceutical in need of further
safety testing in exchange for the tax incentive.
The current Internal Revenue Code 186 allows expenditures on
research to be treated as a deduction. 187 A research tax credit
provision gives a credit for “qualified research expenses” and
“basic research payments” to business entities engaged in research
activities. 188 These tax incentives are designed to stimulate
general research 189 relevant to the development of new
184

See Susan Feigenbaum & Thomas Jenkinson, Government Incentives for Historic
Preservation, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 117 (1984) (tax incentives have stimulated historic
preservation programs). But see Salvatore Lazzari, An Economic Evaluation of Federal
Tax Credits for Residential Energy Conservation, in 7 STUDIES IN TAXATION, PUBLIC
FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS—A COMPENDIUM 82, 87–95 (Fund for Public Policy
Research 1982) (tax credits have had little to no effect on stimulated residential energy
conservation). See generally HOW TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (Henry J. Aaron
& Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981) (explaining the impact of taxation on allocation of
resources in specific areas).
185
See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation
of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 973–74 (1986) (addressing the inefficiency of tax
incentives).
186
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. (2006).
187
Id. § 174(a)(1).
188
Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a tax credit for “qualified
research expenses” and “basic research payments.” Id. § 41(a).
189
S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 13 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 120.
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pharmaceuticals and are generally not applicable to research on
already existing pharmaceuticals. 190 There is an additional tax
credit for qualified clinical testing of drugs to treat specific rare
diseases. 191 Thus, these general provisions do not apply to
postmarket safety testing.
It would be possible to amend the Internal Revenue Code to
include a tax credit for postmarket safety testing of
pharmaceuticals. However, such a credit would likely be a general
provision, not directed at performing specific studies in response to
adverse drug events or scientific evidence suggesting a need to
evaluate a specific risk of a specific drug. In addition, an
important aspect of the research is that it is well-designed to
address the relevant inquiry. 192 To that end, involvement of the
FDA in the approval of the study design is vital to the goal of
improving the safety of specifically identified pharmaceuticals. 193
Unlike a tax credit for general postmarketing research, an
FDA-administered incentive could be aligned to specific interests.
The patent term extension would be applied to the pharmaceutical
evaluated. The mechanism of the provision could be structured
such that a manufacturer would be required to obtain FDA
approval to qualify for the incentive. 194 In addition, the provision
could be activated by a request from the FDA. The process would
not involve movement of funding from the government to the
already profitable pharmaceutical industry. In fact, the PDUFA 195
requires companies using the FDA approval process to pay a user
190
See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to
Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce
Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1069–70 (1994). It is
conceivable that research into utilizing an already existing pharmaceutical for an entirely
new application or delivery system would qualify under the existing Internal Revenue
Code. Id.
191
See 26 U.S.C § 45C.
192
21 C.F.R. §314.126 (2008) (laying out the requirements of an adequate and wellcontrolled study).
193
See THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 1, at 1.
194
Similar to the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, §
409I(a), 115 Stat. 1408, 1408–1409 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
195
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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fee. 196 The current reauthorization of the PDUFA raised the
amount of that user fee in order to pay for increased costs
associated with more extensive postmarketing surveillance. 197 A
tax break to manufacturers implementing postmarketing studies
would effectively reduce the funding to the FDA, especially that
which is needed to monitor the increased workload due to those
studies.
Unlike a tax incentive, a patent term extension would not
reduce tax revenues. A reduction in tax revenues may need to be
balanced by increasing the tax burden of all taxpayers. On the
other hand, the potential increased financial burden on consumers
resulting from higher prices of a drug during an extended
exclusivity period would be borne by the consumers of the drug
who are benefiting from its increased safety. Any financial burden
on the pharmaceutical company for performing the necessary
research would be offset by the increased revenue during the
extended exclusivity period.
The proposal to incentivize postmarket safety evaluation of
pharmaceuticals by extension of the exclusivity period, proposed
in Part III.A, would have no direct effect on general tax revenues
or resources allocated to the FDA. In addition, unlike a tax
incentive, which addresses a general industry goal, the proposal
herein would enable tying the reward to specific well-designed
studies addressing specific safety concerns of identified
pharmaceuticals that would be vetted through the FDA for
approval prior to initiation.

CONCLUSION
Recent products liability suits, withdrawal of pharmaceuticals
from the market, and changes in product labeling suggests that the
196

21 U.S.C. § 379h (2006).
See Prescription Drug User Fee Act Meeting Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 1743, 1750 (Jan.
16, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/Dockets/98fr/07-122.htm. The
FDA’s 5-year PDUFA plan draft is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/pdufa/
PDUFA_IV_5yr_plan_draft.pdf.
197
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current mechanism for safety evaluation of pharmaceuticals is
inadequate. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have little incentive to
perform postmarket clinical studies to evaluate safety of FDAapproved drugs. The FDA’s mechanism to enforce postmarket
evaluation is currently inadequate as drug companies are likely to
pay penalties in lieu of conducting postmarket research. Products
liability, alone, is insufficient to stimulate pharmaceutical
manufacturers to avoid litigation by revealing safety indications
via postmarket research. In addition, the lack of correlation
between risks associated with drug use and potential for expense
associated with litigation removes some value from the threat of
products liability litigation.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers can be incentivized to perform
postmarket safety research by rewarding such research with
extension of market exclusivity. This incentive has proven to be
an effective stimulus to induce pharmaceutical manufacturers to
evaluate FDA-approved drugs for pediatric use. The mechanism
proposed herein, modeled on the Best Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act, provides an economic incentive for pharmaceutical
manufacturers to perform targeted research to evaluate FDAapproved drugs.
The research would result in increased
information on the risks of use of specific pharmaceuticals which
would have a significant impact on the safety of pharmaceutical
consumers.

